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Abstract: Nurcholish Madjid (Indonesia) and Fouad 
Zakaria (Egypt) represent the two most influential Muslim 
thinkers concerned with the issue of secularization. This 
article is a comparative analysis of their ideas, which have 
triggered intellectual debate on the term “secularization” 
and its implications in the Muslim world over the last three 
decades. Positing the discourse on secularization and 
secularism as a means to confront the obscurantist Islamist 
tide, both scholars use it as a starting point to discuss im-
portant issues in the context of their respective countries 
about the necessity to reform the current social, political, 
cultural, and intellectual stagnancy. They differ, however, in 
perceiving the extent of the discourse of secularism. Using 
the term “secularization” very carefully, Madjid makes clear 
that it should not be understood as leading to secularism in 
Indonesia. Unlike Madjid, Zakaria, inheriting the secularism 
debate from his predecessors, is more oriented toward 
rescuing secularism before it totally disappears in Egypt. 
Keywords: Secularization, secularism, Muslim reformists, 
modernity, Islamism. 
Introduction 
Nurcholish Madjid (Indonesia) and Fouad Zakaria (Egypt) can be 
said as two most influential Muslim thinkers who seriously engage in 
the intellectual debate on secularization issue in the Muslim world. In 
                                                 
∗ I wish to thank Michael Sells, Malika Zeghal (Chicago), M. Sani Umar, James Rush 
(ASU), Leonard Binder, Michael Morony, Ismail Poonawala (UCLA), Micheal Feener 
(National University of Singapore), Robert Hefner (Boston University), and Nader 
Hashemi (Northwestern) for the invaluable advice and discussions. 
  
Mun'im Sirry 
JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 
Volume 01, Number 02, December 2007 
324 
the last three decades the idea of secularization launched by Madjid 
and Zakaria has not only triggered the intellectual debate on the term 
“secularization” and its implication in the Muslim world, but also 
unveiled the most complicated issue pertaining to the question as to 
whether or not Islam is compatible with modernity. Since then the 
debates on secularization issue took the form of newspaper articles and 
books, but there also were some widely noted public debates between 
the proponents and opponents of secularism. Madjid himself first 
launched his provoking idea of secularization in the widely attended 
public discussion held in January 1970 at the Islamic Research Center, 
in Menteng Raya, Jakarta. The debate between Zakaria representing 
secularist camp and Yu>su >f al-Qara >d }a>wi> and Muh}ammad al-Ghaza>li > 
representing Islamist camp took place in July 1986 in the Cairo 
headquarters of the Doctors’ Union. These debates revolve around the 
questions: Can Islam be compatible with secularism? Can it be 
integrated into modernity? To what extent can Islam be contextualized 
and reinterpreted in order to make it in harmony with liberty? 
To most Western scholars, this may engender two different 
reactions. On the one hand, many Western scholars would say that 
secularization is a global phenomenon which sweeps all religions of the 
world. In Western literature on the phenomenon of secularization, it is 
not an uncommon thesis that the process of secularization, once it has 
taken root in the West, will inevitably spread like an oil spill all across 
the globe.1 According to this thesis, the non-Western religions will also 
be affected by the process of secularization. Islam is no exception.2 
Even since the first penetration of Western culture, the world of Islam 
has been prone to an ever-spreading process of secularization. On the 
other hand, alterations have also taken place in the way of thinking in 
the West in the past twenty years or so that it is no longer taken for 
granted, as it was in the past, that secularization is to be viewed as an 
inevitable process, almost as an escapable fate which was to spread 
across the entire face of the globe.3 Moreover, many scholars argue for 
                                                 
1 This tenet is one of the underlying ideas of A. Th. van Leeuwen, Christianity in World 
History (Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Press, 1964). 
2 D.C. Mulder, “Secularization in the Muslim World,” in D.C. Mulder (ed.), Secula-
rization in Global Perspective (Amsterdam: VU Boekhandel, 1981), p. 25. 
3 Peter Berger, for instance, says: “If the experience of transcendence is indeed 
ineradicable in human life, then it will sooner or later reassert itself on the level of 
legitimations…. In that case, secularization is neither progressive nor irreversible.” See 
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the exceptionalism of Islam. The British anthropologist Ernest 
Gellner, for instance, says: 
It is possible to disagree about the extent, homogeneity, or 
irreversibility of this trend [secularization]…; but, by and 
large, it would seem reasonable to say that it is real. But 
there is one very real, dramatic and conspicuous exception 
to all of this: Islam. To say that secularization prevails in 
Islam is not only contentious. It is simply false. Islam is as 
strong as it was a century ago. In some ways, it is properly 
stronger.4 
It is hard to accept Gellner’s conclusion that there has not been 
any change in the strength of Islam, as if Islam has not changed since 
the time of the Prophet. On the contrary, we have witnessed that a 
variety of Islamic discourses have mushroomed in the contemporary 
Muslim world. The Muslims’ debate on secularization issue, as I will 
argue in this paper, is not merely aimed at following the path of the 
Western conception of secularization which continues to be used, 
often in a taken-for-granted fashion, to explain the religion-and-society 
relationship,5 but mainly intended as a catalyst to discuss more crucial 
issues pertaining to any effort at reforming or refreshing Muslim 
understanding of Islam. I would argue that it is from Muslims’ debates 
on secularization that the most radical and innovative Islamic thought 
can be found, to the extent that these debates touch upon the very 
core issue facing the modern Muslim world. In order to shed light on 
the secularism debate in contemporary Islamic thought, especially in 
the last three decades, I will focus my analysis on the ideas of the 
leading Indonesian thinker Nurcholish Madjid and Egyptian thinker 
Fouad Zakaria. In the first part, I will identify major issues raised by 
both Madjid and Zakaria which eventually generate fruitful, and yet 
often fierce, discussions among those who oppose and support them. 
In the second part, I will discuss the socio-political context in which 
they launch their progressive ideas and how they affect and even shape 
the discourse on the relationship between state and religion in their 
respective countries. The reason for selecting Madjid and Zakaria is 
                                                                                                      
Peter L. Berger, Against the World for the World: The Hartford Appeal and the Future of 
American Religion (New York: Seabury Press, 1976), p. 12. 
4 Ernest Gellner, Postmodernism, Reason and Religion (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 5. 
5 See, for instance, David Lyon, “Rethinking Secularization: Retrospect and Prospect,” 
Review of Religious Research, 26/3 (March 1985), pp. 228-43. 
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not only because their ideas of secularization and secularism are more 
elaborate than any other Muslim thinkers, but also because they 
represent the two most productive Muslim countries in terms of the 
intellectual debates on Islam and secularism. 
Nurcholish Madjid: A Brief Intellectual Biography 
Just one day after Nurcholish Madjid died on August 29, 2005, at 
the age of 66, three Indonesian Muslim scholars wrote in the daily 
English newspaper The Jakarta Post that “It is simply impossible for 
someone to discuss contemporary Indonesian Islam, or perhaps even 
Indonesia in general, without mentioning Madjid.”6 I think it is not an 
exaggeration for nearly three decades scholars have been writing books 
and dissertations on his ideas and practices. His own articles and essays 
collected in several books received remarkable responses. Cak Nur, 
Madjid is popularly called, is one of the country’s most influential 
thinkers who have been lauded internationally since the 1970s. A wide 
range of labels have been attached to him: Secularist, reformist, neo-
modernist, nationalist, moderate, pluralist, liberal, and most recently 
the nation’s “great teacher (guru bangsa).”  
Madjid was born in 1939 in a small town of Jombang, East Java. 
He received his secondary education at Pesantren Darus Salam in 
Gontor, Ponorogo, known for its discipline and good language 
training, both in Arabic and English. He pursued his first academic 
degree at the Institute of Islamic Studies, IAIN Syarif Hidayatulah in 
Jakarta, where he graduated in 1968. As a student, Madjid was active in 
the Association of Muslim Students (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam) – a 
modernist, urban Muslim student organization, known as HMI – and 
held the very prestigious position of General Chairman during two 
periods: 1966-1969 and 1969-1971.7 It was within the HMI that Madjid 
was able to articulate his intellectual orientations and the fact that he is 
the only individual who has led HMI for two consecutive periods has 
undoubtedly also served to give additional weights to his views and 
                                                 
6 Fachry Ali, Bahtiar Effendy, and Ichsan Ali-Fauzi, “Nurcholish Madjid, for Islam and 
Indonesia,” The Jakarta Post, August 30, 2005. 
7 Karel Steenbrink notes: “Several predecessors and successors of Madjid as General 
Chairman of the HMI became minister of the Indonesian Republic. See Karel 
Steenbrink, “Nurcholish Madjid and Inclusive Islamic Faith in Indonesia,” in Ge 
Speelman, Jan van Lin and Dick Mulder (eds), Muslims and Christians in Europe: Breaking 
New Ground (Uigeverif Kok – Kampen, 1993), pp. 28-43. 
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statements.8 During this period at the HMI Madjid launched a number 
of provoking ideas, the most important of which can be summarized 
under the slogan of secularization.9 
In the late 1970s he went to the United States to pursue this 
graduate studies in Chicago with Fazlur Rahman, a Pakistani-born 
scholar who decided to reside in the U.S. as his life was threatened in 
his own country. Madjid completed his Ph.D. in 1984 with a 
dissertation on the theological thought of Ibn Taymiyya, especially on 
the relation between reason and revelation. Upon his return to 
Indonesia, Madjid founded Paramadina Foundation (Yayasan 
Paramadina) as an intellectual think-tank where he and other scholars 
might freely engage in very productive discussions. In the early 1990s, 
Madjid extended his activities as to establish Paramadina as one of the 
prestigious university in Jakarta. Now Paramadina has a building of its 
own, a regular office, and a good series of publication.  
Twenty years later since he held an important speech on 
secularization issue in the early 1970s, The Jakarta Cultural Center of 
Taman Ismail Marzuki (TIM) invited him to present a stocktaking of 
“20 years of Renewal of Islamic Thinking” on October 21, 1992. At 
that time Madjid did not present an inventory or history of the debate, 
but tackled some old and new problems in his own way. The title of 
his paper was “Some Reflections about Religious Life for the Next 
Generation”, which again evoked a long and hot debate. Some of his 
adverse opponents, including Abdul Qadir Djaelani, were surprised at 
the fact the spirit of Madjid’s reform movement never tends to 
become overcast, but continues to flame.10 Madjid’s books and articles 
continue to generate public debates, but at the same time become 
more influential. His publications include: Cita-cita Politik Islam Era 
Reformasi [Islamic Political Ideals in the Reformation Era];11 Dialog 
Keterbukaan: Artikulasi Nilai Islam dalam Wacana Sosial Politik Kontemporer 
[Open Dialogue: Islam in Contemporary Socio-Political Discourse];12 
                                                 
8 Bahtiar Effendy, Islam and the State in Indonesia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, 2003), p. 71. 
9 Steenbrink, “Nurcholish Madjid and Inclusive,” p. 30. 
10 See Abdul Qadir Djaelani, Menelusuri Kekeliruan Pembaharuan Pemikiran Islam 
Nurcholish Madjid (Bandung: Yadia, 1994). 
11 Nurcholish Madjid, Cita-cita Politik Islam Era Reformasi (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1999). 
12 Nurcholish Madjid, Dialog Keterbukaan: Artikulasi Nilai Islam dalam Wacana Sosial 
Politik Kontemporer (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1998). 
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Islam Agama Kemanusiaan [Islam as Religion of Humanity];13 Islam 
Agama Peradaban [Islam as Religion of Civilization];14 Pintu-pintu menuju 
Tuhan [Ways toward God];15 Islam, Kerakyatan, dan Keindonesiaan [Islam, 
Citizenship and Indonesia];16 Islam: Doktrin dan Peradaban [Islam: 
Doctrine and Civilization];17 Islam, Kemodernan, dan Keindonesiaan [Islam, 
Modernity, and Indonesianness];18 and others. 
Secularization and the Realization of God’s Vicegerent 
The turning point that made Madjid controversial was his 
electrifying speech to a gathering of four Islamic organizations on 
January 2, 1970, in Jakarta. In his paper on “Keharusan Pembaharuan 
Pemikiran Islam dan Masalah Integrasi Ummat (The Necessity of 
Renewal of Islamic Thought and the Problem of Integration of the 
Islamic community),” he offered the straightforward observation that 
Indonesian Muslims suffered stagnation in religious thinking and had 
lost the “psychological striking force” in their struggle.19 The speech 
marked a watershed in his career as for the time in the contemporary 
Indonesian Islam it offered an amalgam of theological, political, 
sociological and hermeneutical analysis.  
Central to his thesis is a critique that vast majority of Muslims were 
unable to differentiate values that are transcendental from those which 
are temporal. In fact, he pointed out further that the hierarchy of 
values was often the reverse; transcendental values were conceived as 
temporal and vice versa. Everything was likely to be perceived as 
transcendental, and therefore, without exception, valued as divine.20 As 
a result of this mode of religiosity, “Islam is [viewed as] equal in value 
as tradition; and becoming Islamic is comparable to becoming 
traditionalist.”21 It is in this context that he called for secularization “to 
make what was temporal stay temporal and liberate the Muslim 
                                                 
13 Nurcholish Madjid, Islam Agama Kemanusiaan  (Jakarta: Yayasan Wakaf Paramadina, 
1995).  
14 Nurcholish Madjid, Islam Agama Peradaban (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1995). 
15 Nurcholish Madjid, Pintu-pintu menuju Tuhan (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1994). 
16 Nurcholish Madjid, Islam, Kerakyatan, dan Keindonesiaan (Bandung: Mizan, 1993). 
17 Nurcholish Madjid, Islam: Doktrin dan Peradaban (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1992). 
18 Nurcholish Madjid, Islam, Kemodernan, dan Keindonesiaan  (Bandung: Mizan, 1987). 
19 Ibid., pp. 204-14. 
20 Effendy, Islam and the State, p. 71.  
21 Madjid, Islam, Kemodernan, dan Keindonesiaan, p. 207. 
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community from the tendency to spiritualize it.”22 Therefore, the 
Muslims should always examine and reexamine the truth of any value 
in the face of material, moral, and historical facts. 
As Robert W. Hefner pointed out, Madjid’s effort at “seculari-
zation” is necessitated by the most central of Muslim doctrines, tawh}i >d, 
belief in the uncompromised oneness of God.23 Madjid argues that 
secularization is also intended to strengthen human functions as 
“God’s vicegerent on earth.” These functions give Men ample room of 
freedom to choose and determine themselves the ways and methods of 
improving their life on earth as well as call them to become responsible 
for their actions to God.24 Therefore, it is safe to say, as Fachry Ali and 
Bahtiar Effendy argue, that Madjid’s fundamental viewpoints derived 
from his radical understanding of two basic principles in Islam: (1) the 
concept of tawh }i >d (oneness of God); and the notion of humans are the 
vicegerents of God (khali>fat al-Alla>h fi> al-'ard}). From these two 
principles he formulated his theological premises which suggest that 
only Allah possesses absolute transcendency and divinity. As a 
consequence to their acceptance of this monotheistic principle, quite 
naturally Muslims should perceive the world and its temporal affairs 
(social, cultural, or political) as they are. Viewing the world and its 
objects in a sacred or transcendental manner can be theologically 
considered to be contradictory to the very notion of Islamic 
monotheism.25 For sacralization of things other than God is, indeed, 
shirk (polytheism), as opposed to tawh }i >d. Madjid argued that the 
concrete meaning of secularization is desacralization of anything other 
than the transcendental, namely this worldly affair.26 
According to Madjid, an Islamic reform is only possible provided 
that Muslims are prepared to undertake a path of renewal. To undergo 
such religious renewal, he suggested that Muslims liberate themselves 
from the tendency to transcend values which are supposedly profane 
                                                 
22 Ibid. 
23 Robert W. Hefner, Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia (Princeton and 
Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2000), p. 117. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Fachry Ali and Bahtiar Effendy, Merambah Jalan Baru Islam: Rekonstruksi Pemikiran 
Islam Orde Baru (Bandung, Mizan, 1986), p. 130; See also Effendy, Islam and the State, p. 
72. 
26 Madjid, Islam, Kemodernan, dan Keindonesiaan, p. 208. 
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into the domain of divinity. As a consequence of the belief that Islam 
is timeless and universal, there is an inherent obligation for Muslims to 
initiate creative thinking relevant to the demands of the modern age. 
This endeavor can only be realized if Muslims enjoy some degree of 
confidence to allow any ideas, however unconventional they may be, to 
be expressed and communicated freely. More importantly, given the 
fact that Islam conceives human beings as naturally oriented towards 
truthfulness, Muslims need to be open-minded. Furthermore, they 
should accept and absorb any ideas, regardless of their origins, 
provided they objectively speak of truth. “[It is] hard to understand 
that Muslims nowadays become more closed and narrow-minded, 
whereas their Holy Book commends that they should listen to ideas 
and follow the best of them,” said Madjid.27 
Finally, Madjid concluded that in order to reformulate and put 
forward new progressive ideas we need groups of “liberal” thinkers, 
who are neither traditionalists nor sectarians. This idea is based on his 
observation that many Indonesian Muslim organizations, which were 
previously known as the agents of reform, have stopped as reformers. 
They were unable to grasp the spirit of the reformation idea itself, that 
is, the idea of progress. He hoped that young Muslim generations 
would be willing and ready to carry out the task of reforming the 
Islamic thinking.28 
Since then Madjid was known as the “locomotive of reform 
movement” and his progressive thought has always been referred to as 
“the movement of reform thinking (gerakan pembaharuan pemikiran).”29 
Undoubtedly his idea of the renewal of Islamic thought triggered a 
widespread controversy within the Indonesian Muslim community. 
The reactions took the form of discussion, speech, Friday sermon, and 
newspaper articles. Those who supported Madjid would say that 
Madjid’s idea was a proper “shock therapy” in order to wake up the 
Muslim community from an intellectual stagnancy and backwardness 
because of their failure to respond creatively to socio-political 
developments. To his opponents, Madjid’s idea of the renewal of 
                                                 
27 Ibid.,  p. 211. 
28 M. Syafi’i Anwar, Pemikiran dan Aksi Islam Indonesia: Sebuah Kajian Politik tentang 
Cendekiawan Muslim Orde Baru (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1995), p. 54. 
29 Pardoyo, Sekularisasi dalam Polemik (Jakarta: Pustaka Utama Grafiti, 1993), p. 91; Ali 
and Effendy, Merambah Jalan Baru, pp. 122-34. 
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thought was too far away from the theological doctrine and 
authoritative sources of Islam. The use of certain terms like 
“secularization,” “liberalization,” “intellectual freedom,” “idea of 
progress,” and so forth were considered too vulgar and devaluating the 
Islamic doctrines. From political perspective, they further argue, 
Madjid’s reform agenda could bring about a disintegration or conflict 
within the Indonesian Muslim community.30 
Secularization versus Secularism 
As far as his main thesis is concerned, he concluded in response to 
such reactions that not much resistance was given to the essence of his 
idea, and most of the reactions and resistance were concerned with the 
problem of terminology, especially the use of the word 
“secularization.”31 He made it clear that he interpreted this idea along 
the lines of Harvey Cox in his well known best-seller The Secular City: 
Secularization and Urbanization in Theological Perspective.32 In this work, Cox 
defines secularization as “the liberation of man from religious and 
metaphysical tutelage, the turning of his attention away from other 
worlds and toward this one.”33 Yet, he maintains that secularization is 
different from secularism. In his words: 
In any case, secularization as a descriptive term has a wide 
and inclusive significance. It appears in many different 
guises, depending on the religious and political history of 
the area concerned. But whatever it appears, it should be 
carefully distinguished from secularism. Secularization 
implies a historical process, almost certainly irreversible, in 
                                                 
30 Among those who supported him were: M. Dawam Rahardjo, Djohan Effendi, 
Utomo Danadjaja, Eky Syachruddin, Usep Fathuddin, and others; while his opponents 
included: Endang Saefuddin Anshari, Ismail Hasan Metarium, Abdul Qadir Djaelani, 
HM Rasyidi, and others. For a more detailed discussion on this, see Ali and Effendy, 
Merambah Jalan Baru, pp. 134-43; Anwar, Pemikiran dan Aksi, pp. 54-99. 
31 Nurcholish Madjid, “Beberapa Catatan sekitar Masalah Pembaruan Pemikiran dalam 
Islam” in his Islam, Kemodernan, dan Keindonesiaan (Bandung, Mizan, 1987), pp. 215-20. 
32 This book was first published in 1965 by The MacMillan Company, New York, and 
soon drew a public attention and widespread controversy among theologians, 
sociologists of religion and others. Within a short time The Secular City had gone into 
multiple printings. One year later after its publication, the same publisher published a 
collection of reaction papers to this book entitled The Secular City Debate, ed. by Daniel 
Callahan (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1966). 
33 Harvey Cox, The Secular City (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1965), p. 15. 
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which society and culture are delivered from tutelage to 
religious control and closed metaphysical world views. We 
have argued that it is basically a liberating development. 
Secularism, on the other hand, is the name of an ideology, a 
new closed world view which functions very much like a 
new religion.34 
The above passage was also quoted by Madjid in his paper to 
indicate that it was the notion of “liberating development” as well as 
the “clear distinction between secularization and secularism” which he 
employed in articulating his ideas concerning the logical consequences 
of Islamic monotheism (tawh}i >d). As he put it in his paper: 
Secularization is not meant as the implementation of 
secularism, because secularism is the name of an ideology, a 
new closed world view which functions very much like a 
religion. In this case, what is meant [by secularization] is 
every form of liberating development… [nor is it] to 
convert Muslim to become secularists. Rather, it is meant 
to temporize worldly values, and to liberate [Muslims] from 
the tendency of making those values transcendental. 
With this statement, he not only provided an explanation of what 
he meant by secularization, but at the same time he also defended and 
reconfirmed his caution of using what his opponents called as 
“Western category.” 
The term “secularization” was meant as a necessary process that 
would enable the Islamic community to distinguish between 
transcendental and temporal values. For Madjid, “secularization”, 
understood as a process of liberating development, is also a conditio sine 
qua non to facilitate Muslims –in accordance with their function as 
vicegerents of God (khali >fat al-Alla>h fi> al-'ard })– in their endeavors to 
relate the universalism of Islam to today’s Indonesia.35 If secularization 
is a dynamic process, it is not the case with secularism. Secularism is a 
worldly ideology. It constitutes a philosophy and new worldview which 
                                                 
34 Cox, The Secular City, p. 18.  
35 This notion of “secularization” can also be found in Madjid’s four other articles, 
written during 1970-73. These include: “Beberapa Catatan sekitar Masalah 
Pembaharuan Pemikiran dalam Islam,” “Sekali Lagi tentang Sekularisasi,” “Perspektif 
Pembaharuan Pemikiran Islam,” and “Menyegarkan Paham Keagamaan di Kalangan 
Umat Islam Indonesia.” All these essays are included in his Islam, Kemodernan, dan 
Keindonesiaan, pp. 215-56. 
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is in contradiction with almost all world religions.36 Therefore, he 
concluded, “although we strongly encourage the process of 
secularization [to take place in our religion and life], but we also 
strongly refuse secularism.”37 
Nonetheless, the controversies and polemics about his use of the 
term “secularization” did not last. Since the 1980s, following his return 
from the University of Chicago where he obtained his PhD under the 
guidance of a prominent Pakistani Muslim thinker of the neo-
modernist stream, Fazlur Rahman, Madjid was able to provide more 
convincing arguments. Although he has remained faithful to the 
substance of his renewal ideas, considering the controversy of the term 
he used, he sometimes suggested to rephrase the term “secularization” 
as “radical devaluation” or “desacralization.” Thanks to the indirect 
intellectual encouragement of similar understanding of 
“secularization”, as promulgated by a number of prominent and 
influential sociologists, such as Talcott Parsons38 and –more 
importantly– Robert N. Bellah,39 he has been able to pinpoint the main 
difference between him and his opponents, namely in perspectives. 
While his opponents, especially HM Rasjidi, understood secularization 
from philosophical point of view, he viewed secularization from 
sociological perspective.40  
From sociological perspective, as Parsons indicates, secularization 
reveals the liberation of society from superstition, and not as the elimi-
                                                 
36 A brief and yet insightful discussion on Madjid’s view on “secularization” versus 
“secularism” can be found in Hefner, Civil Islam, pp. 116-119. 
37 Nurcholish Madjid, “Beberapa Catatan sekitar Masalah Pembaruan Pemikiran dalam 
Islam,” in his Islam, Kemoderan, dan Keindonesiaan, p. 218. 
38 See Talcott Parsons, Edward Shils, Kaspar D. Naegelle, and Jesse R. Pitts (eds), 
Theories of Society: Foundations of Modern Sociological Theory (New York: Free Press, 1961), 
pp. 249-51; 256-63. 
39 See his “Islamic Traditions and the Problems of Modernization,” in Beyond Belief: 
Essays on Religion in a Post-Traditionalist World (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 1991), pp. 146-67. 
40 See Madjid, “Sekularisasi Ditinjau Kembali”, in his Islam, Kemodernan, dan Keindone-
siaan, pp. 257-60. In fact, this article is a footnote of his paper entitled “Sekitar Usaha 
Membangkitkan Etos Intelektualisme Islam di Indonesia” contributed in honor to 70 
years of Rasjidi. See Endang Basri Ananda (ed.), 70 Tahun Prof. Dr. Rasjidi (Jakarta: 
Harian Pelita, 1985). 
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nation of religious orientation of social norms and values.41 Moreover, 
the liberation process could take place as a logical consequence of a 
certain religious orientation, especially monotheism. Robert Bellah calls 
this type of secularization as “radical devaluation, one might legitima-
tely say secularization, of all existing social structures in the face of this 
central God-man relationship. This meant above all the removal of 
kinship, which had been the chief locus of the sacred in pre-Islamic 
Arabia, from its central significance.”42 So, the use of the word “secula-
rization” in sociology could mean liberation, i.e. liberation from 
spiritualizing temporal things. It also means “desacralization” to the 
extent that the sacrality of certain things which are not sacral should be 
avoided.43 
The implication of such theological pronouncements, in Madjid’s 
view, are that there is nothing sacred about matters of an Islamic state, 
Islamic political parties, or an Islamic ideology. Accordingly, Muslims – 
again primarily because of the logical consequences of their adherence 
to the principles of tawh}i >d – should be able to “secularize” or “desa-
cralize” their perceptions on those worldly issues. In the light of this, 
he introduced the phrase: “Islam Yes, Partai Islam No” (Islam Yes, 
Islamic Party No).44 With this jargon, among other things, he 
encouraged his fellow Muslims to direct their commitment to Islamic 
values and not to institutions, even those of Islamic origin such as 
Islamic parties.45 
Fouad Zakaria: A Brief Intellectual Biography 
In contrast to many Egyptian Muslim thinkers who used to hold 
secularist views but now subscribe to political Islam, Fouad Zakaria is 
consistently defending the fate of secularism in the face of the 
increasing strength of political Islam in Egypt. During the 1980s when 
secularism was under siege and severe attack from the Islamist camp, 
Zakaria stood up and spoke on behalf of open secularism at a public 
                                                 
41 In this context, Madjid referred to Parsons’ paper published on book in Parsons, 
Shils, Naegelle, and Pitts (eds), Theories of Society: Foundation of Modern. 
42 See Robert N. Bellah, Beyond Belief (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1970), p. 
151. 
43 Madjid, “Sekularisasi Ditinjau Kembali,” p. 259. 
44 Madjid, “Keharusan Pembaruan Pemikiran Islam dan Masalah Integrasi Umat,” in 
his Islam, Kemodernan, dan Keindonesiaan, p. 204. 
45 Effendy, Islam and the State, p. 75. 
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panel with prominent Islamist thinkers – the first public occasion in 
decades at which secularism was treated seriously as an issue.46 He was 
quite brave to defend secularist views confronting such respected 
`ulama >’ (Muslim scholars) as Yu >su >f al-Qara>d }a>wi> and Muh}ammad al-
Ghaza>li > in front of unfriendly audience. As Nancy E. Gallagher 
described the event, during Zakaria’s talk, the audience had been 
increasingly restless. Each point he made was greeted with rumbling 
and threatening protest. The moderator continually called for silence 
and kept asking the highly partisan audience to show respect to the 
speakers.47 
However, we know a very little about this “leading secular Arab 
philosopher”,48 although prominent `ulama>’ like al-Qara>d }a>wi> feels 
necessary to write a book devoted to rebut Zakaria’s idea of 
secularism, entitled al-Isla>m wa al-`Ilma >ni >yah Wajhan li Wajhin: Radd `Ilmi > 
`ala> Fouad Zakaria wa Jama>’ah al-‘Ilma >ni >yi >n (Islam and Secularism Face to 
Face: Scientific Refutation of Fouad Zakaria and his Fellow 
Secularists).49 One of his opponents, Muh }ammad Ibra>hi >m Mabru >k, 
says that “apart from our intellectual differences, we acknowledge that 
Fouad Zakaria is one of the most prominent Arab thinkers in the last 
quarter of the twentieth century because of his precision and 
consistency in his scientific endeavors to the extent that we should 
always consult his works.”50 Thanks to Ibra>hi >m Abu >-Ra>bi` who 
translated into English one of Zakaria’s important works, Myth and 
Reality in the Contemporary Islamist Movement (2005),51 in which Zakaria 
offers a sustained critique of the intellectual, political, and social 
                                                 
46 Alexander Flores, “Egypt: A New Secularism?,” Middle East Report, no. 153 (July-
August 1988), p. 28. 
47 Nancy E. Gallagher, “Islam vs. Secularism in Cairo: An Account of the Dar al-
Hikma Debate,” Middle East Studies, 25/2 (April 1989), pp. 108-215. 
48 Ibra >hi>m Abu>-Ra>bi`, Contemporary Arab Thought: Studies in Post-1967 Arab Intellectual 
History (London and Virginia: Pluto Press, 2004), p. 97. 
49 Yu>su>f al-Qara >d}a >wi>, Al-Isla >m wa al-`Ilma>ni>yah Wajhan li Wajhin: Radd `Ilmi > `ala > Fouad 
Zakaria wa Jama>’at al-‘Ilma>ni>yi>n (Cairo: Da>r al-S {ah }wah, 1978). 
50 Muh }ammad Ibra >hi>m Mabru>k, Haqi>qat al-`Ilma>ni>yah wa al-Sira >’ bayn al-Isla >mi>yi>n wa al-
`Ilma >ni>yi>n, vol. 2 (Cairo: Da>r al-Tawzi>’ wa al-Nashr al-Islami>yah, 2000), p. 121. 
51 The original title of this book is al-H {aqi>qah wa al-Khaya >l fi> al-H {arakah al-Isla >mi>yah al-
Mu`a >s }irah (Cairo: S {i>na >, 1988). 
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foundations and contemporary manifestations of Islamism in the Arab 
and Muslim world. 
Zakaria was born in Port Said in Egypt in 1927.52 After graduating 
from high school in Cairo he went to the University of Cairo where he 
obtained a BA in philosophy in 1949. In 1952, he obtained an MA 
degree in philosophy from ‘Ayn Shams University and in 1956 he 
received his PhD from the same university. Afterwards, Zakaria taught 
philosophy at ‘Ayn Shams University until 1974. Between 1974 and 
1991, he taught at the Department of Philosophy at Kuwait University. 
In 1998, his students and admirers at Kuwait University published a 
Festschrift in his honor. Currently, Zakaria lives in retirement in Cairo. 
In his early publications, Zakaria published a great number of 
books on Western philosophy and rationalism in general, but later he 
paid much attention to the problem of religious revivalism. Here is a 
summary of his main publications: Nietzsche: Silsilah Nawa>bi >gh al-Fikr al-
Gharbi > [Nietzsche: The Series of Western Genius Thinkers];53 Spinoza;54 
A<ra >’ Naqli >yah fi > Mushkilat al-Fikr wa al-Thaqa>fah [Critical Considerations 
of Cultural and Intellectual Problems];55 Al-Tafki >r al-`Ilmi > [Scientific 
Thinking];56 Khit}a>b ila> al-`Aql al-`Arabi > [Addressing Arab Reason];57 Al-
S {ah}wah al-Isla>mi >yah fi > Mi>za >n al-`Aql [Islamic Revival in the  Scale of 
Reason];58 Al-Thaqa>fah al-`Arabi >yah wa `Azmat al-Khali >j [Arab Culture 
and the Gulf Crisis];59 and A<fa>q al-Falsafah [Horizons of Philosophy].60 
Historical Necessity of Secularism 
Zakaria is not the first to introduce secularism into the Egyptian 
intellectual discursive vocabulary, because the debate on this issue had 
                                                 
52 This biography is heavily based on Abu>-Ra>bi`s account, which he concedes that this 
biography was provided by Zakaria himself to him in an interview in Cairo in January 
2004. 
53 Fouad Zakaria, Nietzsche: Silsilah Nawa>bi>gh al-Fikr al-Gharbi >  (Cairo: Da>r al-Ma`a >rif, 
1956). 
54 Fouad Zakaria, Spinoza (Cairo: Da>r al-Nahd}ah al-`Arabi>yah, 1963). 
55 Fouad Zakaria, A<ra >’ Naqli>yah fi> Mushkilat al-Fikr wa al-Thaqa >fah (Cairo: al-Hay’ah al-
‘A <mmah li al-Kita >b, 1975).  
56 Fouad Zakaria, Al-Tafki>r al-`Ilmi>  (Kuwait: Silsilat `A <lam al-Ma’rifah, 1978). 
57 Fouad Zakaria, Khit }a >b ila > al-`Aql al-`Arabi>  (Kuwait: Kita>b al-`Arabi>, 1978). 
58 Fouad Zakaria, Al-S {ah}wah al-Isla>mi>yah fi> Mi>za>n al-`Aql  (Beirut: Da>r al-Tanwi>r, 1989). 
59 Fouad Zakaria, Al-Thaqa >fah al-`Arabi >yah wa `Azmat al-Khali >j (Cairo: Mat}a >bi’ al-
Ah}ra >m, 1991). 
60 Fouad Zakaria,  A<fa >q al-Falsafah (Beirut: Da>r al-Tanwi>r, 1988). 
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taken place since the middle of the nineteenth century.61 He inherits 
this perennial controversy from his predecessors who first encountered 
with European tangible cultural and intellectual impacts in the Arab 
region. At that point, secularism entered the intellectual debate in the 
Arab world.62 Perhaps, this can be traced back to early Muslim thinkers 
such as Rifa>’a al-T{ah}t }a>wi > (1801-73), Khayr al-Di >n al-Tu >ni >si> (1810-99), 
Jama >l al-Di >n al-Afgha>ni > (1838-97), `Abd al-Rah }ma>n al-Kawa>kibi > 
(1854-1902) and Muh}ammad ‘Abduh (1949-1905). The next 
generations include disciples of ‘Abduh, like Qa>sim Ami >n (1865-1908) 
and Ah}mad Lut}fi> al-Sayyid (1872-1963), and culminated in `Ali> `Abd 
al-Ra>ziq (1888-1966), a graduate of al-Azhar and Oxford, who 
contributed to the debate with a book published in 1925 that turned to 
be one of the most controversial works in modern Islamic history: al-
Isla>m wa Us}u>l al-H{ukm (Islam and the Foundation of Governance).63 
I am not suggesting that there is nothing new with the 
contemporary debate on Islam and secularism. There has always been 
change and continuity, affirmation and revision, in the intellectual 
history of Islamic discourse. Unlike in the case of Madjid, the reactions 
to Zakaria do not merely revolve around the problem of terminology 
and illustration, but also the question as to whether secularism is a 
solution or problem for the Muslim world today. It is interesting to 
note the way in which the proponents and opponents of secularism in 
Egypt delve into the question of historical specificity versus 
universality to justify whether or not secularism is admissible in Islamic 
society. By historical specificity, I mean the tendency among the 
Islamists to limit secularism to the experience of West European and 
North American countries with Christianity. Secularism, they argue, 
was born in pre-modern Christian Europe out of the necessity to fight 
                                                 
61 Azzam Tamimi, “The Origins of Arab Secularism,” in John L. Esposito and Azzam 
Tamimi (eds). Islam and Secularism in the Middle East (New York: New York University 
Press, 2000), pp. 13-28. 
62 For a detail discussion on this, see Nazik Saba Yared, Secularism and the Arab World 
(1850-1939) (London: Saqi Books, 2002). 
63 In that famous and controversial work, Abd al-Raziq asserted that Islam was a 
religion and not a state, a message not a government, a spiritual edifice not a political 
institution, a proposition that led to his defrocking by the Azhar Community of 
`Ulama>’. For a good discussion on `Abd al-Ra >ziq’s liberal idea and some responses to 
it, see Dr. Leonard Binder, Islamic Liberalism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1988), especially chapter IV. 
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the crippling dominance of the church over the political realm and 
over intellectual life. As Muh}ammad ‘Ima>rah, who was once leftist now 
turns Islamist, put it: 
If the European renaissance was linked to secularism, after 
its decline had been tied to the hegemony of religion and 
church over state and society… then the march of our 
Arab-Islamic civilization was exactly the opposite. For the 
Arab-Islamic renaissance was intimately linked to the 
hegemony of the Islamic shari>` ah over a state that was 
civilian and Islamic at the same time, while the deviation 
from the Islamic character of the law was the beginning of 
the path of our nation into inertia and decline.64 
It is this claim of the specificity of the European experience that 
the secularists, such as Zakaria, have bluntly rejected. Let me quote the 
whole of his main arguments: 
The thesis that Islam does not and did not know a religious 
institution at all is greatly exaggerated…. That religious 
authority existed throughout Islamic history. Sometimes it 
used its positions and influence for the defense of the true 
principles of religion, and that led to intense clashes with 
rulers, be they caliphs, sultans or princes. At other times, 
they put themselves at the disposal of the ruler and issued 
statements and fatwa>s for him, giving legal support for his 
behavior even if it was unjust or reckless…. 
[T]he conditions of medieval Christianity were not funda-
mentally different from the conditions prevailing in Islam. 
Of course, there are many details in which the two beliefs 
differ… but they shared the general feature of comprehen-
siveness, and thus one of the reasons justifying the 
emergence of secularism in Europe can also be advanced 
under the conditions prevailing in the Islamic world….65 
Zakaria further argues that “the reasons that pushed Europe in the 
direction of secularism are cropping up in our present Islamic world, 
and therefore the widespread idea that secularism is the result of 
specifically European conditions in a certain stage of its development 
                                                 
64 Muh }ammad ‘Ima >rah, Al-`Ilma>ni>yah wa Nahd }atuna > al-H {adi>thah (Cairo: Da>r al-Shuru>q, 
1987), p. 29. 
65 Fouad Zakaria, Al-S {ah}wah al-Isla>mi>yah fi> Mi>za>n al-‘Aql (Cairo: Da>r al-Tanwi>r, 1989), 
p. 63.  
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is baseless.”66 There is an argument held by several Muslim thinkers 
that secularism was necessary for European progress, while the Muslim 
world did not suffer those conditions that made secularism inevitable 
in European societies. He regrets that this argument was quite 
attractive and appears decisive which places Muslims in an 
embarrassing position and makes a mockery of them. According to 
Zakaria, many writers seem to have taken this argument at face value, 
and here he does not mean Islamists such as al-Ghaza>li >, al-Qara >d }a>wi>, 
Anwa >r Jundi >, and ‘Ima>rah, but also others influenced by Western 
culture such as H{assa>n H{anafi >, Muh}ammad ‘A<bid al-Ja>biri >, and Ismat 
Syaf al-Dawlah.67 
In addition to advancing historical argument, Zakaria moves 
forward to challenge the Islamists’ rhetorical or propagandist criticism 
of secularism. Most Islamists look upon secularism as a kind of kufr 
(unbelief) and irtida>d (apostasy).68 A leading Egyptian theologian 
Muh}ammad al-Ghaza>li > issues a fatwa> that whoever advocates 
secularism is an apostate from Islam.69 The first victim of this type of 
fatwa> was Faraj Foda who was assassinated by two members of Islamic 
Jihad on June 8, 1992, for having been a secularist and an outspoken 
critic of Islamic organizations. The assassination of Foda took place a 
few months after he was involved in public debate with al-Ghaza>li > at 
the Cairo Book Fair in January 1992.70 Indeed, nowadays, Islamists 
have succeeded in equating secularism with atheism in the mind of 
public, using it as a slogan to intimidate their political adversaries, 
charging them with apostasy and unbelief, deserving the death 
punishment. 
Zakaria acknowledges that this charge against secularism is the 
Islamists’ strongest and most dangerous weapon. “When the secularist 
                                                 
66 Zakaria, Al-S {ah}wah al-Isla>mi>yah, p. 66. 
67 Fouad Zakaria, Myth and Reality in the Contemporary Islamist Movement (London and 
Ann Arbor: Pluto Press, 2005), p. 33. 
68 Fauzi M. Najjar, “The Debate on Islam and Secularism in Egypt,” Arab Studies 
Quarterly, 18/2 (Spring 1996), p. 2. 
69 See Muh }ammad Ibra >hi>m Mabru>k, Al-`Ilma>ni>yu>n (Cairo: Da>r al-Tawzi>`  wa al-Nashr 
al-Islami>yah, 1990), p. 148. 
70 Alexander Flores, “Secularism, Integralism and Political Islam: The Egyptian 
Debate”, Middle East Report (July-August 1993), p. 34; Najjar, “The Debate on Islam 
and Secularism,” p. 3. 
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position is predefined as irreligious, the whole question is resolved 
before any debate takes place.”71 In this case, it does not matter 
whether the judgment passed by the Islamists is antithetical to both 
logic and history, since no one exerts any effort to think about 
accurately. What is more important is to distort the reputation of the 
secularists in the minds of people by manipulating the term 
“secularism.” According to Zakaria, “it is true that some reject religion 
but certainly many other secularists are religious, and many religious 
people are secularist, since, in both cases, religion preserves its sacred 
character by being distinct from changing religious practices, while at 
the same time organizing important parts of human life, such as the 
ethical and spiritual.”72 Even the European secular movement, to 
Zakaria, was not a reaction against religion but against a method of 
thinking. Europeans were advancing in science and industrialization, 
and the biggest obstacle to these advances was the closed religious 
thinking of the church.73 
Contrary to its critics, argues Zakaria, secularism is not the product 
of a particular society in a specific phase of its evolution, but it is a 
necessary requirement for any society threatened by the oppression of 
tyrannical and authoritarian modes of thinking, in which millions of 
people are subjected to a systematic campaign to rob them of their 
ability to question, criticize, and think about their future. Zakaria 
contends that the Islamists’ confusion of the term clearly reflects the 
decline of Arab thought in the past two decades. An example of this 
decline is the fact that a large number of Arab people, including the 
Islamists, blindly embrace wrong ideas without first engaging in much 
contemplation or thought. 74 
The Project of Arab Enlightenment 
Abu >-Ra>bi` in his Introduction to Zakaria’s work tries to posit the 
latter’s idea of secularism within the current project of Arab 
enlightenment (tanwi >ri >).75 It is not without reason because since the last 
three decades the contemporary Arab enlightenment trend has been 
                                                 
71 Zakaria, Myth and Reality, p. 24. 
72 Ibid., p. 25. 
73 See Gallagher, “Islam vs. Secularism in Cairo,” p. 210. 
74 Zakaria, Myth and Reality, pp. 44-5. 
75 Ibra >hi>m Abu>-Ra>bi`, “Translator’s Introduction,” in Zakaria, Myth and Reality, p. XIII. 
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exhausted. Recently, however, we have witnessed the emergence of 
progressive groups that struggle to disseminate liberal and rational 
ideas and to revive Egypt’s enlightenment tradition. Worthy of 
mention is Jam`i >yat al-Nida>’ al-Jadi>d (the New Appeal Society), 
established in late 1992, as a “platform for liberal thought.” Its 
founders, mostly university professors, leading thinkers, businessmen 
and media persons, stress the need for disseminating and strengthening 
liberal values and ideas. They believe that Egypt had experienced a 
great liberal tradition, worthy of revival and development, and that 
enlightenment and conscious understanding of Islam and Arab culture 
would demonstrate that they are in harmony with liberty. Another 
important group is called Jam’i>yat al-Tanwi >r (Enlightenment Society), 
established in October 1992 by a group of Egyptian intellectuals. They 
also strive to revive Egypt’s enlightenment tradition.76 
How does Zakaria’s idea of secularism fit to this project? We 
should keep in mind that most of these enlightenment groups emerged 
to counteract the rise of the Islamist tide in contemporary Egypt. As 
Zakaria admits, secularism presently is on the defensive in every 
sphere. That is to say, its major goal at present is to resist this torrential 
Islamist current.77 It is not an exaggeration to say, therefore, that 
Zakaria represents the most innovative and serious attempt to salvage 
the contemporary Arab liberal and enlightenment movement from its 
current historical impasse.  
Having been on the defensive, Egyptian secularists and 
intellectuals have finally taken certain measures to counteract the 
Islamist tide. Convinced that the triumph of the Islamic movement 
would set Muslim society apart from the rest of the world, and out of 
date and out of touch with real life, Zakaria argues that Islam should 
be properly understood in order to be in harmony with the modern 
age. He takes a critical position vis-à-vis the applicability of the Qur’a>n 
and the viability of Islamic tradition in the modern era. A critical 
thinker, he says, must subject both the Qur’a>n and tradition to strict 
historical criticism if he/she is to learn from them.78 Zakaria basically 
encourages the same methodology adopted by both Mohammad 
                                                 
76 See Najjar, “The Debate on Islam and Secularism,” p. 3 
77 Zakaria, Myth and Reality, p. 17. 
78 See Ibra >hi>m Abu>-Ra>bi`, Contemporary Arab Thought (London and Virginia: Pluto 
Press, 2004), p. 117. 
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Arkoun and Nas }r H{a>mid Abu > Zayd in the analysis of Islamic religious 
tradition.79 
Seen from this point, we can understand that what is meant by 
secularism is not a carbon copy of Western secularism. There is 
something more important that he wanted us to grasp. That is, the 
rational project of enlightenment. To put this in words of Zakaria: 
In reality, such values as rationality, criticism, logic, and 
mental independence are not unique to Western civiliza-
tion, but are found in Islamic civilization as well. 
Contemporary secularists in the Muslim world need not be 
carbon copies of modern Western thinkers, but rather an 
extension of the rational tradition of the Mu’tazilites, al-
Fara>bi>, Ibn Rushd, and Ibn al-Haytham.80 
In other words, enlightenment is ingrained in the Islamic tradition. 
Hence, enlightenment means giving priority to reason in apprehending 
existence and the world. The Mu’tazilites, he says, were the first 
champions of reason in Islam. In modern times, the reformist 
Muh}ammad ‘Abduh stressed that rational inquiry is one of the 
principles of Islam.81  
However, Zakaria’s contention that “secularism as an idea, as a 
movement, and as a worldview is a civilizational necessity (d }aru>rah 
had}a>ri >yah),”82 is highly contested by the Islamists. The question would 
be: Is it possible to accept secularism without the political and social 
package associated with it? Probably Zakaria would answer “yes”, since 
secularism, at least to his understanding, is nothing but a reflection of a 
specific discourse of thinking that must not be connected to the West 
and that secularism reflects a constant intellectual necessity on the part 
of any society trying to break from authoritarianism and move forward 
autonomous reason.83 
Socio-Political Context 
Although Madjid and Zakaria live in different social and political 
contexts, both use the discourse on secularization and secularism as a 
                                                 
79 Ibid. 
80 Zakaria, Myth and Reality, p. 41. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Abu>-Ra>bi`, Contemporary Arab Thought,  pp. 122-3. 
83 Zakaria, Myth and Reality, p. 41. 
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starting point to discuss important issues about the necessity to reform 
the current social, political, cultural, and intellectual stagnancy. In other 
words, secularization is not a goal, but only a means to confront the 
obscurantist Islamic tide. By secularization, about which Madjid 
actually means desacralization, Madjid is able to take the idea of 
Islamic state off from political agenda in Indonesia. For Madjid, the 
term “secularization” is meant as a necessary process that would 
enable the Islamic community to distinguish between sacred and 
profane values, and the Islamists’ conception of an Islamic party or 
Islamic state is far from being sacred or Islamic.  
Zakaria is also facing the proliferation of Islamist trends in 
contemporary Egypt which forces progressive thinkers like him to 
challenge the Islamist basic argument for the implementation of 
shari>’ah: the comprehensive nature of Islam (sha>mil). In his debate with 
al-Qara>da>wi> and al-Ghaza>li >, Zakaria contends that religion does not 
have to cover all aspects of life. “One could maintain respect for 
religion while leaving other activities for human endeavor.”84 He 
mentions that there is overlapping of the human and the divine in the 
life of every human being. Human and natural law is partly derived 
from the customs and values of the people which include religious 
beliefs. Likewise, the shari>’ah is based in part on local customs and 
values. He reminds the “Islamist camp” of the distinction they must 
draw between “textual Islam” and “historical Islam.” He argues that 
implementing the shari>’ah falls in the domain of “historical Islam,” and 
therefore, it needs “a careful and comprehensive re-examination in 
light of the fact that from the standpoints of science and reason, 
everything in the human arena is subject to change.”85 
However, one would notice the different tone in which both 
Madjid and Zakaria used the terms “secularization” and “secularism” 
respectively. Madjid seems to be very careful in using the term 
“secularization” to the extent that he made clear that it should not be 
understood as to lead to secularism. He agreed with his critics that 
secularism is a closed ideology (suatu paham yang tertutup), an ideology 
that is denying the real life after this world.86 He then cited the 
                                                 
84 See Gallagher, “Islam vs. Secularism in Cairo,” p. 210. 
85 Zakaria, Myth and Reality, p. 9. 
86 Nurcholish Madjid, “Sekularisasi Ditinjau Kembali,” in his Islam, Kemodernan dan 
Keindonesiaan, p. 257. 
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Qur’anic verses (su>rat al-Ja >thiyah: 24) to indicate that secularism is not 
compatible with religion, especially Islam.87 
One possible reason for this cautionary attitude is the fact that he 
was one of the first, if not the first, to introduce secularization issue 
into the Indonesian theological discursive tradition.88 Before the 1970s, 
there was not much, if any at all, discussion about the compatibility of 
Islam and secularization. There had been many discussions and 
polemics on modernization issue, but none of them was related to 
secularization. In 1968, two years prior to his speech, Madjid engaged 
in discussions with a number of Indonesia’s “secular modernizing 
intellectuals” concerning the issue of modernization. In his view it 
appears that the underlying messages behind the rhetoric of 
modernization as promulgated by those intellectuals in the early period 
of the New Order regime were belittling –not to say anti– religious 
values. According to Madjid, some of them even depicted the calls to 
Islamic prayer using audio devices as “electronic terrors”. In this 
debate he argued very strongly that modernization is not the emulation 
of Western cultural values. Rather, in his view, “modernization is 
rationalization, not Westernization.”89 As recorded by a Malaysian 
scholar Muhammad Kamal Hassan in his dissertation, this intellectual 
position earned him the title “the young Natsir (Natsir muda)”.90 
Although in the 1950s and 1960s many Western scholars believed that 
modernization would have resulted in the process of secularization, 
Madjid 1968’s paper entitled “Modernization is Rationalization, not 
Westernization” did not allude even in passing to the secularization 
issue. Many scholars, including his close associate Ahmad Wahib, 
                                                 
87 Madjid, “Sekularisasi Ditinjau Kembali,” pp. 257-8. 
88 I think Hefner is correct when he makes an insightful observation that “The 
influence of early New Order debates on Madjid’s scholarship was also evidence in the 
fact that one of the first topics he chose to take from his discussion group out into the 
public arena concerned the thorny issue of secularization.” See Hefner, Civil Islam, p. 
116. 
89 Madjid, “Modernisasi ialah Rasionalisasi bukan Westernisasi,” in his Islam, 
Kemodernan, and Keindonesiaan, pp. 171-203. 
90 Muhammad Kamal Hassan, Muslim Intellectual Responses to “New Order” Modernization 
in Indonesia (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka Kementrian Pelajaran 
Malaysia, 1982). 
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suggested that Madjid’s visit to the United States in 1969 “changed his 
thoughts and views,” an allegation of which Madjid had rejected.91 
If we look at the notion of “secularization” that appeared in his 
five articles written during 1970-73, we find some interesting 
developments in Madjid’s idea. As Kamal Hassan notes, Madjid’s ideas 
before the 1970s represented the idea of “idealist Muslim” or simply a 
reformist, while after the 1970s he tended to be more “realist-
accommodationist”.92 Madjid attempted to elaborate the Islamic 
thought in its relation with the modernization of socio-political attitude 
of contemporary Indonesian Islam. In other words, unlike his 
predecessors, such as Mohammad Natsir, Rasjidi, Deliar Noer, and 
others, Madjid’s ideas seem to be more empirical. Of course, Madjid 
was aware of the fact that secularism has acquired “bad” connotation. 
In his 1970’s paper that made him controversial, he has in the first 
place distinguished between secularization and secularism, by saying 
that “secularization is not meant as the application of secularism.” He 
then attempted to give “new meaning” to the term “secularization” 
different from secularism commonly understood in the West. 
However, due to several criticisms, he made it clear that he used the 
term “secularization” not in its “anti-religious” tendency, but as 
“liberating development”, by referring to the Harvard theologian 
Harvey Cox. It is difficult to ascertain whether Madjid at that period 
was aware of the fact that Coxian conception of secularization evoked 
a storm of comments and criticisms; because, in Cox’s opinion, the 
decline of religion is irreversible in the “secular city”.93 What is certain 
is that after he returned from the University of Chicago he no longer 
referred to Harvey Cox to justify the sociological meaning of 
secularization, but instead, he referred to the sociologists Talcott 
Parsons and Robert Bellah. Perhaps, he was by then aware of the 
controversy surrounding Cox’s work, to the extent that it is impossible 
for him to avoid a controversy if the source from where he derived his 
                                                 
91 Nurcholsih Madjid, “Sekapur Sirih,” in Pardoyo, Sekularisasi dalam Polemik, p. xv.  
See also Anwar, Pemikiran dan Aksi,  p. 47. Compare this to Hassan, Muslim Intellectual 
Responses, p. 118. 
92 Hassan, Muslim Intellectual Responses, p. 89. 
93 20 years later after the publication of his The Secular City, Harvey Cox revised some 
of his previous ideas and he now believes that “religion returns to the secular city.” See 
Harvey Cox, Religion in the Secular City: Toward a Postmodern Theology (New York: Simon 
and Schuster, 1984). 
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idea of secularization is itself controversial. In an article he wrote in 
1985, he said:  
Although the sociological meaning of secularization has 
been widely used by social scientists, we still have to 
acknowledge that the controversy does not come to an end. 
That can be illustrated by the debate and controversy about 
Harvey Cox’s The Secular City. The difficulty arises from the 
fact that the Enlightenment Age in Europe had produced 
the philosophy of secularism as an anti-religious ideology.94 
For Madjid, it is more important to discuss the substance of the 
idea of Islamic reform than to make a fuss about terminology. In the 
aftermath of the controversy, as Hefner notes, “Madjid himself 
expressed misgivings at his choice of terms, commenting publicly that 
his reference to “secularization” had invited misinterpretation.”95 
Madjid then concluded, “Therefore, considering the never-ending 
controversy of the terms “secular”, “secularization”, and “secularism”, 
it is a wise not to use those terms, and instead we can use technical 
terms which are more acceptable and neutral.”96 
Unlike Madjid, Zakaria is far from being the first to introduce the 
term “secularism” into the Egyptian intellectual discourse, rather he 
inherited the secularism debate from his predecessors. In Zakaria’s 
time, as he himself admits, secularism is on defensive side, and he 
comes to rescue secularism before it totally disappears. Zakaria’s 
anxiety is understandable, for since 1970s, which Geneive Abdo calls 
“the third wave of Islamic activism”, the Islamists had been gaining 
considerable popularity.97 By 1981, they gained enough organizational 
strength to assassinate President Anwar Sadat. Unable to take over the 
government, some factions of the Islamist groups participated in the 
Parliamentary elections and now become members of Parliament. 
Perhaps, the strongest issue for the Islamists was the shari>’ah question 
on which their position were supported by broad sectors of the 
Egyptian people.98 It is in this context that Zakaria strongly contends 
                                                 
94 Madjid, Islam, Kemodernan, dan Keindonesiaan, p. 260. 
95 Hefner, Civil Islam, p. 118. 
96 Madjid, Islam, Kemodernan, dan Keindonesiaan, p. 260. 
97 Geneive Abdo, No God but God: Egypt and the Triumph of Islam (Oxford and New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 7. 
98 Barry Rubin, Islamic Fundamentalism in Egyptian Politics (New York: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 1990), p. 24. 
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that in fact the Islamic movements have no a specific plan for society 
as a whole and that their concern is limited to the individual, as if the 
total of individuals makes up a society.99 
That is why Zakaria seems to be very aggressive in his defense of 
secularism in order to encounter the current Islamist tide in Egypt. In 
his view, the Islamist ideal of an Islamic state undermines the very 
nature of civil society, and only secularism can safeguard the freedom 
and human rights. Secularists like Zakaria are convinced that Arab 
society contains the necessary seeds for secularization and 
modernization, and that what is needed is a proper implementation of 
secularist philosophy and worldview.100 
However, it is simply a mistake to group Zakaria into the extreme 
secularist camp (tat }arruf `ilma>ni >). If we use the categorization made by 
William E. Shepard, Zakaria can be grouped as moderate. Shepard 
divides secularism into two categories: pure secularism and moderate 
secularism. The former is “any view that would openly follow an 
ideology other than Islam in most areas of public life,” and the latter 
“seeks to separate religion from politics and other areas of public 
life.”101 Muh}ammad ‘Ima>ra describes the moderate secularist: “They 
are believers in God as Creator of the universe, but non-believers in 
Him as an administrator and ruler of worldly affairs.”102 Zakaria is 
aware that some of his opponents have labeled him as an extreme 
secularist. He asserts that secularist authors like him are of course 
careful in the choice of their words to avoid “the accusations of 
unbelief that the ignorant uses to threaten any intellectual striving to 
bring a gleam of light into darkened minds…. One will discover that 
the arguments of most secularists against the interpretations of 
Islamists are also derived from Islam itself and are presented in a 
context affirming secularists’ desire to declare themselves innocent of 
                                                 
99 Issa J. Boullata, Trends and Issues in Contemporary Arab Thought (New York: State 
University of New York Press, 1990), p. 156. 
100 Abu>-Ra>bi`, Contemporary Arab Thought, p. 121. 
101 William E. Shepard, “Islam and Ideology: Towards a Typology,” International Journal 
of Middle Eastern Studies, no. 19 (1987), p. 309. 
102 See Muh }ammad `Ima >rah, Ma`rakat al-Isla >m wa Us }u>l al-H {ukm (Cairo: Da>r al-Shuru>q, 
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an accusation that they know beforehand will be leveled against 
them.”103 
Another point deserves a careful examination is the relation 
between the secularist discourse and power. However, because of 
limited space, I will allude to this issue briefly. Indeed, the most 
striking difference between Indonesia and Egypt is the fact that there 
has been a long-held policy of Indonesian governments to provide 
ample opportunities for Muslim secularists to articulate their 
progressive ideas by restricting the religious agenda of the Islamists. In 
contrast, Egyptian governments have had antagonistic attitudes toward 
the secularist and Islamist groups. Throughout the history of post-
independent Egypt, the regimes might overawe the Islamist movement 
and later destroy it. The Nasr regime once smashed the Muslim 
Brotherhood in the 1950s and 1960s, and later he wanted them to help 
him counter the Marxist left. Sadat did the same thing by reviving the 
Brotherhood, but later felt threatened so that he repressed them 
causing his assassination in 1981. President Husni Mubarak seems to 
deploy a clever tactic by allowing the moderates to take part in the 
Parliament while at the same time cracking down the radical Jiha>di > 
wings.  
As a result, as Geneive Abdo has demonstrated, in the last ten 
years the Islamist movement increasingly gained significant popularity 
not only in the grassroots, but also among professionals, business 
community, intellectuals, and other segments of the middle class.104 Of 
course this situation strikes the liberals and secularists as dangerous 
and a step backward, away from the civil society they regard as the 
only way to progress. “Secularism in the Arab world is on the 
defensive in every sphere,” screams Zakaria. The Islamists are now 
unhampered to the extent that they can threaten their opponents and 
bring them to the court to be officially declared as apostates. The case 
of Abu > Zayd can perfectly illustrate this situation. Therefore, the 
secularist voices are increasingly unheard.105 
                                                 
103 Zakaria, Myth and Reality, p. 21. 
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105 For a detailed discussion on Abu> Zayd’s case, see Fauzi M. Najjar, “Islamic 
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In Indonesia, the success of the Islamic reform movement cannot 
be imagined without the socio-political environment, including the 
regimes’ accommodative policy, which is conducive for such a 
movement to grow. Since the Sukarno regime, the first President of 
Indonesia, the Islamic political parties’ activities were restricted. In 
1960, the largest Islamic party Masyumi was banned and its leaders 
were arrested. During the Suharto regime, the relation between the 
regime and the Islamist groups did not improve, and he allowed only 
three political parties to compete in the general election none of which 
can be based on religion. He used repressive measures to exterminate 
any Islamic movement which he considered a threat to his 
government. As a result of these discouraging circumstances, coupled 
with the Suharto regime’s determination to establish political order and 
stability at the expense of popular participation, it is fair to say that 
political Islam has been to large extent marginalized.106  
I would argue that Sukarno’s and Suharto’s repression of political 
Islam between 1955 and 1998 ―and the response of Muslim politicians 
and intellectuals to that repression― produced a sea change in Muslim 
political culture. In addition, we simply cannot ignore the fact that the 
regimes’ support for the new Islamic intellectualism directly or 
indirectly makes it possible for this movement to flourish and 
influence the political Islam tendency towards moderation. The fact 
that Madjid was appointed as a member of Advisory Board of the 
Indonesian National Youth Committee (KNPI) –as the youth wing of 
the ruling party– in 1974, was an indication of government’s support 
for the actor and initiator of the Islamic reform movement.107 Perhaps, 
this phenomenon can be said as a starting point for the involvement of 
young Muslim intellectuals in the national political arena. And this 
eventually brought about a new wave of relationship between Islam 
and the state in which Muslims became increasingly integrated into the 
process of development and modernization. 
Conclusion 
The debate on Islam and secularism has currently intensified as 
many Muslim majority countries confront an internal as well as 
external pressure demanding freedom and democracy. Judging 
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secularism as an illicit does not occur in Egypt only, but also in 
Indonesia. In July 2005, a government-sponsored “Council of 
Indonesian Ulama (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, known as MUI) issued a 
fatwa> banning “secularism”, “liberalism”, and “pluralism.”108 
Unfortunately, in both Indonesia and Egypt, the fatwa>s on secularism 
revolve around the problem of the terminology by identifying 
secularism with anti-religious movement. The whole trend of their 
argument is based on their assertion that if one believes in God, one 
cannot believe in secularism; that if one believes that religion is basis of 
one’s life then one can have nothing to do with secularism. In short, 
secularism has come to mean atheism. 
Of course it is too simplistic. They ignore the very fact that the 
concept of secularism has changed over times, and even in the West 
the discussion on secularism and secularization is far from being over. 
One Muslim author says that the concept of secularism has grown 
from its original concept of being anti-religion to a concept where 
respect for all religions is advanced and where discrimination on the 
basis of religion is not allowed to be practiced by a state. “On that 
basis,” he says, “Islam to my mind is fully compatible with 
secularism.”109  
It is clear that  those Muslims who oppose secularism, as I discus-
sed earlier, view secularization and secularism in very unsophisticated 
nature, for they rely above all on the dictionary meanings of “secular” 
and “secularism”, which are invariably defined as “rejection of 
religion”, or “a system of doctrines and practices that disregards or 
rejects any form of religious faith and worship.” I would argue that this 
is no longer the concept of secularism, which already radically changed 
in the last hundred years. Surprisingly, none of the standard 
dictionaries have taken note of the changes in the concept of 
secularism since its first conceived.110 If we accept these definitions 
                                                 
108 This fatwa > was issued by MUI in its “National Convention” in Jakarta, on July 26-
29, 2005. 
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then only communist states can qualify as truly secular. The two 
Muslim scholars discussed above have invited us to talk about 
secularism and secularization beyond the dictionary meanings. To 
them, it is not a heresy at all to insert a new (contextualized) meaning 
to the term or even to make it as a catalyst to discuss more crucial 
issues facing the Muslim world today.[] 
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